A couple in Richmond Hill have been talking about having a child for four years and have not moved. Both want one. Every conversation stops at the same point. The far side of the world — Seoul — has now produced the same pattern at the scale of a country.
How many children do Korean women want, and how many do they have?
South Korea has the lowest fertility rate among the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: under 1 child per woman. That single figure frames every clinical conversation about family building in the country, because it describes behaviour at the population level while saying nothing about what women themselves report wanting. The gap between the two is where the psychology sits.
In a 2022 cross-sectional survey in Seoul, future fertility intention among women of childbearing age was 25.6 percent overall: 27.9 percent among unmarried women and 22.0 percent among married women. Intention was higher among self-employed women at 33.3 percent, among those who received sexual education in adulthood at 48.6 percent, among those who believed in having children after marriage at 44.0 percent, among those who thought children strengthen the relationship at 32.5 percent, and among those who perceived gender equality in their family or workplace culture at 31.7 percent. A separate cross-sectional study of 181 unmarried employed adults aged 25 to 40 found that about 77 percent planned to have children and more than 60 percent wanted 2 or more.
What actually raises the intention to have a child?
Among the measured variables, the strongest single correlate of higher childbearing intention was the perception of gender equality in family or workplace culture, at 31.7 percent. That figure sits above the overall Seoul intention rate of 25.6 percent and above the married-women rate of 22.0 percent. What moves intention, in this evidence, is not enthusiasm for infants but a credible expectation that the load will be shared.
Several other conditions travel with higher intention. Self-employment at 33.3 percent suggests that control over one’s own schedule matters more than income level alone. Adult sexual education at 48.6 percent is the highest figure in the survey, which points to knowledge and planning rather than romance as a driver. Belief in having children after marriage at 44.0 percent and the belief that children strengthen the relationship at 32.5 percent are attitudinal, and attitudes are exactly what couples bring into a consultation.
In the separate study of 181 unmarried employed adults, of the 4 levels examined, only intrapersonal factors were statistically significant: intention to marry, fertility knowledge, and attitudes towards parenthood. The model explained 59.6 percent of the variance in childbearing intention. Partner and environmental factors did not reach significance in that model. The practical reading is that the decision is carried largely inside one person’s head and values before it is ever negotiated between 2 people. [Needs further verification: both studies were carried out in South Korea and measure intention, and it is not yet clear that the same association holds as strongly in Iranian diaspora communities.]
Couples who deadlock over children usually do not disagree about the child itself. — Image: AI-generated / Gemini 3.1 Flash via OpenRouter
Why does wanting a child not turn into having one?
The Seoul data support this reading indirectly. Married women reported lower intention than unmarried women, 22.0 percent against 27.9 percent, which is the opposite of what a simple desire model would predict. People already inside the institution of marriage appear to have clearer information about what the institution costs them. Meanwhile the belief that children strengthen the relationship, held by 32.5 percent, predicts intention but does not settle the division of labour.
In this evidence the fertility knot is not a knot of desire but a knot of conditions, and the clearest condition associated with higher childbearing intention was the perception of gender equality at home and at work, not a financial incentive. The limitations matter here: cross-sectional designs cannot show direction, the Seoul sample is urban only, and both studies measure intention rather than births. What they can show is that the blockage sits upstream of the delivery room.
Postponement is rarely one large decision; it is the accumulation of small not-yets. — Image: AI-generated / Gemini 3.1 Flash via OpenRouter
What does this evidence mean for an immigrant couple?
In the consulting room, couples who deadlock over children almost never disagree about the child. They disagree about who halves their career after the birth. Once that question is put on the table and given a clear answer, the conversation moves again — even when the answer is “not yet”. This is consistent with the survey finding that perceived gender equality at 31.7 percent and relationship-strengthening beliefs at 32.5 percent both accompany higher intention.
The immigrant context does not remove the question. It adds a second one: which set of family expectations is being imported, and by whom. The evidence base here is South Korean and intention-based, so it should be applied as a lens rather than a prediction. Still, the direction is hopeful. If intention tracks conditions rather than appetite, then conditions are negotiable, and a couple that names the career question honestly has more room to move than one still arguing about dates.
Does low childbearing intention mean women do not want children?
No. In the Seoul survey future fertility intention was 25.6 percent, yet in a separate study of 181 unmarried employed adults about 77 percent planned to have children. The gap between wanting and having is filled by conditions, not by desire.
Which factor was most strongly associated with intention?
In the Seoul survey, women who perceived gender equality in their family or workplace culture reported 31.7 percent intention, above the 25.6 percent overall figure. This is an association, not proof of causation.
So financial incentives do not work?
These studies did not measure financial incentives directly. What they measured was how people perceive their conditions — and that perception tracked higher intention. No conclusion about incentives can be drawn from this evidence.
Where should a couple start?
By separating two questions: do we want a child, and after the birth who halves what? When the second question gets a clear answer, the first one usually stops being a deadlock.
Conclusion
South Korea has the lowest fertility rate among the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development — under one child per woman — while in one study of 181 unmarried employed adults aged 25 to 40 about 77 percent planned to have children. Put side by side, those two figures say the same thing: what is scarce is not the desire, it is the conditions.
If one variable deserves the emphasis, it is this: in the Seoul survey the highest intention appeared among people who saw their circumstances as manageable, including those who perceived gender equality at home and at work, at 31.7 percent against the 25.6 percent overall. For a couple, that means moving the conversation from do we want a child to after the birth, who halves what.
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1. Nguyen TTL, Nguyen VC. Factors associated with future fertility intentions among Korean women of childbearing age in Seoul: a cross-sectional study. Women’s Health Nursing. 2024;30(4):288-298. PMID 39756473. DOI: 10.4069/whn.2024.12.06.1
2. Shin H, Lee A, Choi S, Jo M. Childbearing intentions and influencing factors among single young adults in South Korea: a cross-sectional study. Child Health Nursing Research. 2025;31(1):15-27. PMID 39895294. DOI: 10.4094/chnr.2024.025
Sources retrieved from PubMed.
Image Credits
All three images in this article are AI-generated and none depicts a real person — Images: AI-generated / Gemini 3.1 Flash via OpenRouter.
